## Anaphoric Temporal Locators and Discourse Structure

Several authors (cf., e.g., Asher 1993) have used discourse structure to constrain anaphora resolution, that is, to prevent cases where the anaphor is not identified with the right antecedent. Others - cf. Alves and Txurruka 1991 and 2001, Bras et al. 2001a and 2001b, and Alves 2003 - have studied the interaction between temporal adverbials and discourse structure, showing that not only does discourse structure have impact on temporal relations (cf. e.g. Lascarides and Asher 1983 and Kamp and Reyle 1983) but also that temporal explicit connectives might have impact on discourse structure. This paper is about adverbial temporal locators and discourse structure. In particular, I shall focus on ambiguity involving a group of anaphoric temporal locators that I'll call anaphoric temporal locators without predicative content. These locators underspecify their antecedents. Because of this, they can relate both to antecedents provided by time-denoting expressions and to antecedents representing the running time of an eventuality, giving rise to ambiguity cases in sequences where both kinds of antecedents are available. In most cases, however, ambiguity does not arise due, that's my claim, to constraints related to world-knowledge and discourse structure, which leads to disambiguation. A proposal to account for anaphora involving these locators is made within Segmented Discourse Representation Theory (cf., e.g., Asher 1993). I'll concentrate on anaphoric temporal locators both in English and in Portuguese, although here, due to space constraints, only examples in English are presented.

Anaphoric temporal locators are expressions as those in bold type in the following examples:
(1) John was born in 1980. Mary was born the same year.
(2) John gave a party last weekend. He met Mary then.
(3) Mary arrived in Lisbon on May $12^{\text {th }}$. John arrived the previous day.

These expressions temporally locate the eventuality described by the sentence in which they occur, and they are anaphoric because the definition of the time interval they represent depends on the linguistic context that precedes them.
(4) ????Mary was born the same year.
(5) ????He met Mary then.
(6) ????John arrived the previous day.

In DRT terms (cf. e.g., Kamp and Reyle 1993), they introduce in the respective DRS the following elements: (i) a new discourse referent $t$; (ii) an identity condition of the type [ $\mathrm{t}=$ ? $]$; (iii) depending on the type of locator, predicative conditions such as [year( t$)$ ] or [day( t$)$ ]; (iv) other conditions, depending on the existence of relational expressions as, for instance, same and following. Antecedents of anaphoric temporal locators are discourse referents of type $t$ already present in the DRS under construction. They are introduced in the DRS directly by time-denoting expressions - cf. the expressions underlined in (7)-(9) - or indirectly via several types of functions that account for the possibility of our inferring time from eventuality descriptions, as in (10)-(13).
(7) John visited Paris in 1980. Mary visited London that year.
(8) John had a car accident last Monday. He arrived late to school that day.
(9) Mary graduated in June 1987. John graduated the same month.
(10) Mary went to Paris. She stayed at the Hilton then.
(11) Last evening John cooked dinner. Meanwhile Mary read the newspaper.
(12) Mary wrote John a letter. He answered her the same week.
(13) John had a car accident last week. He arrived late to school that day.

In (10)-(11), function loc which assigns to an eventuality the interval of time it occupies (cf Kamp and Reyle 1993: 608) introduces in the DRS the necessary anaphoric antecedents of then and meanwhile. In (12) and (13), functions s-loc and d-loc (cf. Alves 2003) respectively assign to an eventuality the day and the week in which it occurred.

In what concerns the question under study here, a relevant distinction is that between locators with predicative content as that month, the same year, the day before and locators without predicative content as, for instance, then, after that, at the time. The former introduce DRS conditions as those mentioned in (iii), whereas the latter do not. The former constrain the expression providing their antecedents to describe a certain calendar unit (day, month, year, etc.), whereas the latter somehow underspecify their antecedents. This means that (at least some) locators without predicative content might pick up discourse referents introduced by time-denoting expressions and discourse referents introduced via the above mentioned functions. See the following examples:
(14) Mary arrived home around midnight. John arrived after that.
(15) John visited Paris in 1980. Mary visited London then.

These examples are ambiguous in what concerns the anaphoric antecedent of the temporal locators. In (14), after that might refer back to the discourse referent introduced by around midnight or to the discourse referent supplied by the eventuality of Mary's arriving home. In (15) then might refer back to the discourse referent introduced by 1980 or to the discourse referent representing the running time of the eventuality described in the first sentence. In other words, what (15) communicates is that Mary visited London while John visited Paris or else that Mary visited London in the same year that John visited Paris. For the sake of illustration, see below the DRSs corresponding to the two possible interpretations of (15), where the conditions regarding the anaphor and the anaphoric antecedent are in bold type:

DRS-(15)a

| $\begin{gathered} \mathrm{nxyt} \mathrm{t}_{\mathrm{c}} \mathrm{et} \mathrm{t}^{\prime} \mathrm{wz} \mathrm{t} \mathrm{t}^{\mathrm{a}} \mathrm{t}_{\mathrm{c}}{ }^{\mathrm{a}} \mathrm{e}_{1} \\ \text { John (x) } \end{gathered}$ |
| :---: |
|  |  |
|  |
| 1980 (tc) |
| $\mathrm{t}=\mathrm{t}_{\mathrm{c}}$ |
| $\mathrm{e} \subseteq \mathrm{t}$ |
| $\mathrm{e}<\mathrm{n}$ |
| e: x visit y |
| $\operatorname{loc}(\mathrm{e})=\mathrm{t}^{\prime}$ |
| Mary (w) |
| London (z) |
| $\mathrm{t}^{\mathrm{a}}=\mathrm{t}^{\text {a }}$ |
| $\begin{aligned} & \mathrm{e}_{1} \subseteq \mathrm{t}^{\mathrm{a}} \\ & \mathrm{e}_{1}<\mathrm{n} \end{aligned}$ |
|  |  |
|  |
| $t_{c}{ }^{\text {a }}=\mathrm{t}_{\mathrm{c}}$ |

DRS-(15)b

| $\mathrm{nxyt} \mathrm{t}_{\mathrm{c}} \mathrm{et} \mathrm{t}^{\prime} \mathrm{wzt} \mathrm{t}^{\text {a }} \mathrm{c}^{\text {a }} \mathrm{e}_{1}$John (x) |
| :---: |
|  |  |
|  |
| 1980 ( $\mathrm{t}_{\mathrm{c}}$ ) |
| $\mathrm{t}=\mathrm{t}_{\mathrm{c}}$ |
| $\mathrm{e} \subseteq \mathrm{t}$ |
| $\mathrm{e}<\mathrm{n}$ |
| e: x visit y |
| $\operatorname{loc}(\mathrm{e})=\mathbf{t}$ ' |
| Mary (w) |
| $\begin{gathered} \text { London }(\mathrm{z}) \\ \mathrm{t}^{\mathrm{a}}=\mathrm{t}_{\mathrm{c}^{\mathrm{a}}} \end{gathered}$ |
|  |  |
|  |
|  |
| $\mathrm{e}_{1} \begin{array}{r}\mathrm{W} \text { visit } \mathrm{z} \\ \mathbf{t}_{\mathbf{c}}{ }^{\mathbf{a}}=\mathbf{t}^{\prime}\end{array}$ |
|  |  |

However, even though locators without predicative content might pick up different types of antecedents, in most cases ambiguity does not arise. Consider the following examples, involving the discourse relations of Elaboration, Background and Result (cf. Lascarides and Asher 1993, for a definition of these DRs):
(16) John visited Paris in 1980. He saw the Mona Lisa then.
(17) John visited Paris in 1980. He was 20 years old at the time.
(18) Ana had a car accident in 1980. She quit driving after that.

In these sequences, the anaphoric locators - then, at the time and after that - refer back to the time interval corresponding to the running time of the eventuality described in the first sentence of each sequence. The other readings - according to which they would refer back to the time interval denoted by 1980 - are not available because they are incompatible with the discourse relations that hold between the two segments in each sequence - Elaboration in (16), Background in (17), and Result in (18). These discourse relations have impact on the temporal relations holding between the two relevant eventualities: in the first case, the second eventuality is temporally included in the first; in the second case, the second eventuality includes the first; in the third case, there is temporal abutment between the two eventualities. Accordingly, the anaphoric locators have to be interpreted as relating to the running time of the eventualities.

Let us consider now examples involving other types of discourse relations, namely Contrast (signalled here by but) and Parallel (marked by also):
(19) Mary arrived home around midnight, but John arrived after that.

John visited Paris in 1980, but Mary visited London then.
(21) John visited Paris in 1980. Mary also visited Paris then
(22) John visited Paris in 1980. He also saw the Mona Lisa then.

In the Contrast cases (cf. (19)-(20)), the only possible interpretations seem to be those where the anaphoric locators refer back to around midnight and 1980, respectively. It is the presence of but and its explicit marking of Contrast (to be distinguished from Expectation Denial) that blocks the reading according to which the anaphors relate to the running times of the previously described eventualities. Notice that these same examples, without but, were shown above to be ambiguous (cf. (14)-(15)). Similarly, in the Parallel cases (cf. (21)-(22)), the only available readings seem to be those in which the occurrences of then refer to 1980. (22), in particular, sounds odd. There seems to be a conflict between our world knowledge, which tells us that seeing the Mona Lisa in the Louvre is part of typical visit to Paris, and the presence of also, indicating that the second eventuality cannot be interpreted as being part of the first. The explicit marker also blocks the Elaboration reading and the resulting discourse is hard to interpret, unless we introduce new linguistic material in the context as (23) a-b below:
(23) a. John visited Paris in 1979.
b. He saw the Mona Lisa.
c. He visited Paris in 1980.
d. He also saw the Mona Lisa then.

However, here, what licenses also is not sentence c. but sentence b. Regarding Parallel and Contrast, what seems to be the case is that these discourse relations appear to be incompatible with temporal inclusion of eventualities, this being the reason why one of the two available antecedents is excluded.

The examples given below are different than those presented before. Here the anaphor refers back to a time interval whose boundaries are provided by the linguistic context (and in the second case also by utterance time), although that interval is not directly represented in the same linguistic context.
(24) Mary left Paris in May and returned in June. In the meantime, her car was robbed.
(25) The school will hire a new teacher only next year. In the meantime, Mary teaches course 303.

The linguistic context provides with more than one possible antecedent, but also here worldknowledge and discourse structure constrain the antecedents to be, in the first case, the running times of the described eventualities (and not May and June) and in the second case the running time associated to the hiring of a new teacher (and not next year). If we understand that in (24) the second eventuality is somehow enabled by the first (Enablement) and that in (25) the second eventuality is a result of the first (Result), then the anaphors have to be resolved as said above.

## Conclusions

As was shown above, some anaphoric temporal locators might relate to more than one antecedent giving rise to ambiguity cases that discourse structure. Discourse structure helps to disambiguate those cases. The choice of an antecedent is related to the discourse relation that holds between the discourse segment where the anaphor occurs and the segment providing possible antecedents. This is true not only about discourse relations that have been described in the literature as having temporal impact (Background, Elaboration, and Result), but also about others as Parallel and Contrast. To account for such locators and for the anaphoric relation they express, a framework involving the computation of discourse structure, as for instance SDRT, is therefore needed.

## References

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