Csaba Pléh

(Budapest University of Technology and Economics; Hungarian Academy of Sciences)

Epigenetic theories of the human brain and the issue of the organisation of the mind

Tuesday, 21 November, 2006, 5 PM CEU Department of Philosophy, 1051 Budapest, Zrínyi u. 14, 4th floor, rm. 412.

Abstract

I shall start from the general claims of  (now) traditional cognitive science regarding the structure of the mind  and its unfolding. Two key conceptual cornerstones of this attitude are the idea of mental modules and their innate organization. Since the mid 80s, several rival proposals have emerged regarding these assumptions. In my talk I shall argue for a biologically tenable structure of the mind where task and domain specific systems are assumed but they are still unfolding through an interaction with the environment. Three types of arguments will support the proposed view. First, general selectionist theories of development and brain organization, like that of Edelman and Changeux, will be presented that claim a role for self organization in structuring the brain  and mind, and a  stabilizing (selective) role for role the environment. Second, data from studies on language processing will be analyzed to illuminate certain aspects of brain organization. A combination of the high temporal resolution of electrophysiological methods and the high spatial resolution of imaging methods allows us to decompose the complex process of understandings and reveal some of its brain modules, while at those time indicate the constrained flexibility of the architecture. Finally, I shall present some data on the unfolding of mental architecture based on observation in atypical development -- in particular, Williams syndrome. This rare disorder has been regarded by many cognitive researchers as one of the clear cases of simple dissociation: good language and week spatial skill, and within language, good grammar and trouble with exceptions. Genetic disorders, according to this view, have a modular impact on the mind, impairing spatial cognition, wile leaving language intact for example. Our data imply a more subtle image. There are domains, like visual   integration, spatial memory, where there is clear dissociation, while in other areas there are only slow downs connected to overall learning difficulties of a less modular nature. On the basis of these data I shall argue for a less compartmentalized and less dissociative image of development and mental organization, that implies a type of genetic determination where epigenesis is directed by the genes but not in a one to one correspondence. The genetic program for behavior is a program for the unfolding of that behavior. This has interesting implications for the way the philosophical claims for modularity have to be reformulated.